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BOOK REVIEWS
ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, by Karl Mannheim,
edited by Paul Kecskemeti. Oxford University Press, New
York, 1953. viii, 319. $6.50.
The second volume of Professor Mannheim's posthumous
essays, expertly introduced and edited by Dr. Paul Kecskemeti
of the RAND Corporation, is principally composed of material
new to publication or to the English language. Mannheim was
a fertile writer on the methods of social science who never failed
to test his tools on the most pressing and refractory issues of
our time. The present collection is a remarkable sampling of
Professor Mannheim's intellectual curve of development since
the essays range from his doctoral dissertation through later
work in Germany and Great Britain.
Professor Mannheim began in the tradition of Max Weber
as a philosopher, historian, and sociologist. He found in the con-
ception of "structure" a master clue to the understanding of
intellectual life, conceiving that the methods and results of an
individual thinker are achieved within the limiting frame of
group experience. Similarly the intellectual creations of a group
depend upon the larger context of intergroup relationships.
When the accent is upon the primacy of the whole the con-
tributions of any part sink into the shadow. "History" seems to
take the initiative and to impress an "essence" or at least a
signature upon every detail. The scholar thus deals with "his-
tory" by describing, awaiting, or even prophesying; not by
moulding or evaluating. He is left vulnerable during those crisis
years in which "history" seems to be going against his deepest
values, which was most emphatically the case with Mannheim
during the debacle of Germany-and the West.
If Professor Mannheim had been a theologian or a meta-
physician, he would have concerned himself with speculations
about the trans-empirical nature of the crisis. He was, however,
by training a scientist and by postulate a man of democratic
values. He saw in the exposed seams of society an opportunity
and a challenge to arrive at a firmer understanding of the cir-
cumstances under which the values of human dignity can be
generally adhered to. Hence he responded with keen sympathy
and active imagination to the emphasis in the United States on
the empirical study of man. Reproduced in this book is the well-
known review of Methods in Social Science in which he argued
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for the fusion of the structural tradition of German sociology
with the workways of American social science.
As Mannheim strove to put his program into practice he
made anew the discovery that had been made before him by
the Americans-themselves usually trained in Germany-who
had given an empirical slant to social science in the United States.
The discovery was that a systematic conception of social psychol-
ogy (including personality development) is essential; and that
this must be a new discipline occupying an intermediate con-
ceptual and observational position between structural sociology
and psychology. Of all the psychologies the most comprehensive,
penetrating and revolutionary known to Mannheim was psycho-
analysis; and he threw himself into the task of furthering a
synthesis in which Freud would be found beside Weber.
This is the significance of several chapters in this collection,
notably the last four, which reproduce for the first time lectures
given at Oxford in 1938. These seminal papers go to the heart
of the policy questions that arise in "The Age of Planning." Is
planning necessarily totalitarian? Must it abolish non-conformity,
individuality, privacy? Or can there be democratic planning in
which there is premeditated scope for non-conformity so that
zones of uncharted growth are deliberately provided in the
institutional system? Mannheim summoned our contemporary
knowledge of personality to support the view that "non-
totalitarian," "non-liberal" (non-laissez faire) planning is scien-
tifically possible. As a champion of planned freedom Mannheim
was making no forecast about the probability as distinct from
the potentiality of this outcome.
Is Mannheim's position "conservative" or "progressive" in
the senses in which these terms are used in the author's famous
study of German conservative thought (reproduced here)?
Mannheim distinguished between "traditionalism" which is ad-
herence to the familiar, and is present in any social setting, and
'conservatism" which is the rejection by a group of a progressive
challenge that has won a great deal of support in the social con-
text. Conservative thought therefore occurs under particular
sets of circumstances. Mannheim analyzed German conserva-
tism as an answer to the progressive ("new") challenge of
"natural law" rationalism. If we think of "national socialism-
communism" as the progressive ("new") challenge of our time,
we note that it speaks in the name of a natural law of historical
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predestinarianism. Mannheim is among those who reject this
conception in the name of a scientific view of nature's laws in
which potentiality, rather than predetermination, is the principal
characteristic. It would be a rewarding exercise to explore Mann-
heim's thought with the same tools with which the author con-
ducted his pioneering analysis of the Romantics.
Clearly the works of Karl Mannheim belong to that select
category of fundamental studies basic to the equipment of any-
one responsibly concerned with grasping or affecting the policy
processes of our epoch.
Harold D. Lasswell*
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD IN TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES, by Robert R. Wilson. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1953. Pp. vii, 321. $4.50.
"Treaty law" has been much in the domestic news of late,
and in the contemporary writing about and teaching of inter-
national law in this country it is being increasingly stressed.
In the law school world it may be that through shifts in the
coverage of courses in international law, by the creation of
courses such as counseling in international transactions, and as
a result of the development of "international legal studies"'
the law of treaties is now beginning to receive that degree of
close attention which some two decades ago legislation began
to get.
Professor Wilson's meticulous study is a considerable con-
tribution to the more detailed study of specific treaties and types
of treaties. Essentially, his book takes us behind the language
of the treaty to the concepts of, or to "the concepts about the con-
cepts" of, customary international law which his research indi-
cates are to be associated with that language.
The chief utility of his work may well turn out to be this:
that at an early stage of a new emphasis on treaty law Professor
Wilson has called our attention to a fact sometimes overlooked
in connection with the development of studies in legislation:
* Yale Law School and Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences, Stanford, California.
1. A useful term to cover a good many different things, which it seems
should be credited to Harvard; see Cavers, The Developing Field of Inter-
national Legal Studies, 47 AM. POL. SO. REV. 1058 (1953).
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